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1 Introduction
Proposals for new sources of development finance are considered in detail in the
project-related discussion papers. Each of them raises a number of distinct issues, which
are properly discussed in the individual studies. But there are also over-arching issues.
What is the role of new sources in relation to existing ODA? Should we be seeking new
sources that generate a double dividend? Can the key elements of a proposal be
achieved by another route? It is with these general concerns that the present paper deals
with. Its aim is to set out a number of the common questions that arise in considering
sources of new revenue for development finance.
One purpose of our study is to bring to bear on global public finance the accumulated
knowledge in the field of national public finance, and more generally public economics.
This process is two-way. Public economics has increasingly had an international
dimension, as evidenced by the founding in the early 1990s of the journal International
Tax and Public Finance. There has been a close link between public economics and
development planning. However, changes in the world economy mean that a global
perspective has to be built in from the start. For both national governments and for
individual households and firms, we need to analyse public policy taking account of the
inter-relations between countries. As was observed by Mendez, ‘a critical element
lacking in the fields of finance and international relations is a theory and system of
international public finance’ (1992: 11).
The application of the public economics approach leads one to ask a number of key
questions. Those considered here are set out in the titles of sections 2-6. The aim is not
to provide definitive answers, but to clarify the questions being asked and to suggest
possible answers that are not immediately apparent. To illustrate the issues, I refer at
different points to the seven schemes studied in the project. There is of course a risk that
by considering together such disparate measures we may be confounding the issues. The
different instruments raise different concerns. However, one of the key lessons of
modern public economics is that it is often valuable—indeed necessary—to consider
within a common framework different forms of government policy. The first two
questions concern the specification of the proposals; the remaining three questions
involve the economic impact of the proposals. In each case, precision requires a degree
of economic reasoning, but every attempt has been made to render this accessible.
Bearing in mind the dictum of Stephen Hawking that each equation halves the number
of readers, there are no equations.
2 What is the role of new sources?
The first question we need to address is the relation between new sources of
development finance and an expansion of ODA. Are these to be seen as alternatives?
Many proponents of new sources view them as a way of achieving an increased flow of
development resources without recourse to increased ODA. Other people see this as a
reason for opposing the exploration of new sources: Tobin taxes or other new schemes
would, on this view, weaken the resolve of rich countries to meet the UN ODA target.
Or the new sources would ‘crowd out’ other forms of finance. The new global lottery
may generate new revenue but reduce the receipts of existing lotteries that have been2
used to fund development projects. According to this school of thought, the new sources
should be a net addition to the flows of ODA.
In this study, both kinds of argument are treated, and it is important to distinguish
between the case where the new sources are a net addition to the total of development
resources and the case where they are a substitute for ODA. Figure 1 seeks to clarify the
issue. We are agreed that additional resources are required to meet the development
targets. This involves moving from the starting point O in Figure 1. This could be
achieved by increased ODA, moving from O to B horizontally in Figure 1.
Alternatively, it could be achieved by exploiting new sources, which is the move from
O to A vertically in Figure 1. In both cases, we have a package of increased resource
flows and increased development spending. On the other hand, proponents, or
opponents, of new sources may contrast them with increased ODA. They may say that,
holding the total transfer constant, the position A is better or worse than the position B.
The importance of distinguishing between the two types of movement illustrated in
Figure 1 is a key lesson from the public finance literature. The incidence of taxation
depends on what else is being varied at the same time. As Musgrave set out in his
classic Theory of Public Finance (1959), one possibility is ‘tax/expenditure incidence’,
where revenue is increased and spending goes up by the same amount. As shown in
Figure 1, the introduction of new sources involves moving vertically. ODA remains
unchanged and the benefit from the additional revenue is seen in the contribution to
development goals. In this case, we have to consider the effectiveness of aid in
achieving these goals and the absorptive capacity of the recipient countries.
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Alternatively, we can move along a line holding development-spending constant, while
varying the sources of funding. In Musgrave’s terminology, this is ‘differential tax
incidence’: the differential implications of different means of securing a given flow of
resources. For example, if a global Tobin tax raises new revenue, and this is used to
reduce the need for additional ODA, then it allows domestic taxation to be lower. The
case for the new tax then turns on the differential impact of the two kinds of taxation—
and their relative political appeal.
The distinction between two different types of incidence is drawn from the taxation
literature, but similar questions arise with other proposals for new sources. Consider the
global lottery discussed in Addison and Chowdhury (2003). Opponents criticise this
proposal on the grounds that the burden falls predominantly on poorer people in rich
countries and on poor countries, whereas the cost of ODA financed through income
taxation is borne by the better off. This distributional analysis relates to a differential
analysis of substituting a global lottery for increased ODA (moving from B to A in
Figure 1). In contrast, a global lottery as an addition to existing funding may have quite
different implications. The transfer from rich countries may be distributionally
progressive in world terms, and the redistribution within the rest of the world may
favour development. We may think differently about a lottery that moves us from O to
A than about one which moves us from B to A. The International Finance Facility,
discussed in Mavrotas (2003), involves an increase in ODA but of limited duration,
timed to achieve the MDG by 2015, and donors making a pre-commitment, so that the
promises can be ‘banked’. We can consider the proposal either as a net addition to
existing ODA (moving from O to A) or compare it with the alternative of a steady
annual flow of ‘un-precommitted’ ODA of the same present value (comparing A
and B).
2.1 Conclusion
When considering innovative sources, we need to be clear whether they are seen as a
complement to expanding ODA or as an alternative. In the former situation, the case has
to be made in terms of enhanced funding for development; in the latter situation, the
case is being made that the innovative sources are a better way of funding a given
development effort.
3 What fiscal architecture?
New sources of development finance potentially involve a number of actors. In some
cases, private individuals acting alone, like Ted Turner, or the person putting coins in
the UNICEF Change for Good envelope, can make the key decision. In many cases,
national governments are involved. They can simply involve a country acting
unilaterally. A single country could provide matching funds for private funding of
development by its citizens. A government could decide that a fraction of the proceeds
from its state lottery is to be allocated to development aid. A country acting unilaterally
could decide to allow emigrants’ remittances as a deductible item against its national
income tax. But in most cases it is envisaged that there would be a multilateral
agreement. Indeed, in the case of the creation of new Special Drawing Rights (SDR),
the constitution of the IMF requires a super-majority (85 per cent) of members to ratify4
the agreement before it can be put into effect. Where the source involves multilateral
action, then two questions arise under the general heading of ‘architecture’. In
discussing this, I am presupposing that the participating countries have agreed on the
form and scale of the action to be undertaken. What we are considering is the shape of
the necessary institutions.
3.1 Flexible geometry
The first question is: Does the success and effectiveness of any particular proposal
depend on complete adhesion of all countries or all donor countries? The natural instinct
of many people is to assume that there is an inherent free-rider problem and that there
has to be general, if not universal, agreement. In the present climate, with
multilateralism under question, this presumption provides grounds for pessimism about
the chances of making progress.
On the other hand, suppose that we start from the position that universal agreement may
be impossible and examine the implications of going ahead with a subset of countries.
The US has so far prevented the creation by the IMF of Special Drawing Rights, and in
this case no action seems possible. But it does not follow that other measures are also
blocked. With the other six proposals, it would be possible, at least theoretically, for
progress to be made even without the agreement of all major countries. Here we can
learn from the internal experience of the European Union (EU). The EU has in the past
faced situations where one member state chose to ‘opt out’ of collective decisions. In
these circumstances, flexibility in the resulting institutions has allowed the majority to
respect the opting-out decision but still make progress towards the majority objectives.
Partial adhesion has had costs. For instance, a member state opting-out of social
protection may (or may not) enjoy a competitive advantage, exporting unemployment to
the rest of the Union. These costs have to be placed in the balance. But the issue
becomes one of balance, rather than of an absolute block on action.
We have to ask therefore in the case of each proposal whether we can in fact have a
‘flexible geometry’, where it is viable to go ahead with a subset of countries? The likely
answer to this question varies from one proposal to another. The costs of incomplete
coverage depend on the nature of the source of funding. Failure of countries to
participate in the International Finance Facility means that the scale of the operation is
reduced, but the proposal is not undermined. The same applies to the global lottery, or
the global premium bond; indeed insofar as these schemes offer a new product (see
Solimano 2003), those not participating may lose out. With global taxation, the free-
riding problems become potentially more significant. Significant opting-out from a
global carbon tax may erode the taxbase, as producers relocate to non-participating
countries, and expose participating countries to intense lobbying from domestic
interests. With a currency transactions tax, ease of relocation of financial activity
depends on how extensive is the taxing jurisdiction. The larger the jurisdiction, the less
elastic the response, and hence the greater the revenue potential.
3.2 Fiscal architecture
The second question concerns the institutional arrangements under which multilateral
action takes place. Where countries are acting in concert, then the organizational5
structure is important, as is illustrated in this section by reference to global taxation. A
flow chart for national taxation is shown schematically in Figure 2. National
governments determine the rates of taxation and the taxbase. Individual taxpayers pay
the taxes to the government, which both enforces payment and is in turn accountable to
the electorate. Many taxes involve intermediary agents. The individual taxpayer, for
example, pays the aircraft departure tax to the airline, which then accounts for the
revenue to the government. Employers collect payroll taxes. Retailers or wholesalers
collect excise taxes.
One evidently cannot apply exactly the same process to global taxation (Figure 3). We
have both global institutions and national governments, and it is the latter which have to
agree to the taxes being levied and which are accountable to their electorates. It could
indeed be that the global tax is treated as simply a glorified domestic tax, with the
revenue being forwarded by national governments to a global spending body (the heavy
lines in Figure 3). But there are more possibilities, as shown by the dashed and dotted
lines. If there were an international air transport tax determined at the global level, then
the airline could transfer the money, not to the national government, but to a global tax
authority, in which case the new source of finance would bring a new actor into play.
The dashed lines in Figure 3 show this. Whether or not such a world tax authority is
envisaged is one of the questions that have to be considered. (This may be different
from an international tax organization, see Tanzi 1999.) The feasibility of creating such
a tax authority depends on the universe of taxpayers. In the case of airlines, there is
already an international organization (IATA) and the international air travel tax could be
collected by this body. A world tax authority could not deal with taxes paid by
individual households, but one could envisage it operating a tax levied on multinational
corporations, which would have to be registered where their cross-border activity
exceeded a certain amount (just as there is an exemption level for VAT registration in
national systems). In the literature on the corporation tax, one of the arguments for such
a taxbase is that the status of incorporation confers benefits on organizations adopting
this legal form. It is normally agreed that this does not justify present levels of corporate
income taxation, but a more modest rate of global corporation tax could be seen as a
form of benefit taxation for engaging in cross-border economic activity.
Moving in the opposite direction from the introduction of a world tax authority is the
case shown by dotted lines in Figure 3, where national governments retain not only
control over the administration of the tax process but also discretion over the tax rates.
In this case, participating governments would agree on their national tax liability but
retain freedom to decide how the revenue is to be raised. This would in effect be
applying the principle of subsidiarity adopted by the European Union. To give a
concrete illustration, suppose that the participating governments agree that each country
should pay a tax related to national carbon emissions. This determines the amount that
each participating country has to pay, but the national government would remain free to
raise the revenue in whatever manner it thought fit. The national government might
consider, for example, that a tax on air journeys was unfair on those living in remote
rural areas, and choose for domestic reasons a different taxbase. We would then have a
two-tier structure, with the national tax obligation requirement being agreed
multilaterally, but the tax implementation being chosen locally. Countries with more
emissions would pay more total tax, but this would not necessarily mean higher fuel
taxes. Income tax or a broad-based VAT could be raised instead. One reason why, under
the subsidiarity architecture, a national government may choose a different taxbase is6
that it faces political opposition to a particular form of taxation. The fuel tax protests of
2000 in Europe provide a good illustration.
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The United States and other federal states, such as Canada and Australia, came into
existence by a voluntary adhesion of previously sovereign states. The formation of the
United States of America represented a pooling of sovereignty, just as the acceptance of
a global responsibility for development involves some limitation on the freedom of
action of national governments. This leads us to ask what lessons we can learn from the
extensive literature on fiscal federalism, and this is the subject of Boadway (2003). The
reader may object that fiscal federations involve a degree of symmetry among
participants that invalidates the application to the global context, where it is the inherent
asymmetry in the world that generates the very problem with which we are concerned.
But many of the federations that came into existence involved participating states that
were unequal to a significant—if not the same—extent. Much of the debate about
federal finance is concerned with the treatment of unequals: the design of equalization
formulae.
3.4 Conclusions
Proposals for new forms of development funding raise important issues of institutional
shape. In designing the architecture of global fiscal system, there is considerable scope
for choice and it should not be assumed that all depends on universal support by donor
countries. As the references to ‘flexible geometry’ and to ‘subsidiarity’ illustrate, we
can learn usefully about the range of alternatives from the experience of supra-national
groupings such as the European Union. The parallel with the public finances of federal
states seems worth exploring.
4 Leaky bucket or double dividend?
As Arthur Okun expressed it in his book Equality and Efficiency (1975), transfers are
made using a leaky bucket. To raise US$10 billion for new development purposes may
cost more than US$10 billion. Put another way, the marginal cost of US$1 extra public
funds for development may be more than US$1, because taxes and other interventions
distort economic decisions. ‘The cake gets smaller as we seek to share it out.’ On the
other hand, there are arguments, usually put under the banner of ‘double dividend’, that
there may be efficiency gains, so that the amount in the bucket is actually increased.
And the literature on the marginal cost of public funds has shown that there are
circumstances when the marginal cost of US$1 is less than US$1 (see Atkinson and
Stern 1974; Fullerton 1991 and Sandmo 1998). In this section, I consider these two
different perspectives.
Why are buckets leaky? The first source of leakage is the cost of administration.
Currency transactors may pay $X billion in tax but $(X-A) billion is the net revenue,
where A is the cost of operating the tax collection and enforcement agencies. It may, for
this reason, be preferable to raise an existing tax, such as income tax, rather than to
institute new taxes with all the fixed costs of administration. The second source of
leakage is that a new revenue source may crowd out other sources of development
funding. One of the lessons of public finance is that in calculating the change in revenue
resulting from an increase in one tax, one has to take account of the possible impact on8
the revenue from other taxes. A good example would be an international tourist tax (not
considered in this study). As Clunies-Ross (1999) points out, tourism is an important
source of government revenue for a number of poor countries. To the extent that visiting
tourists have less to spend after they have paid the tourist tax, these countries will be
receiving less sales tax on the purchases made by tourists and would have to be
compensated before the tax yields net additional revenue. Similarly the introduction of a
global lottery will affect national budgets. Part of the customer base will be drawn from
existing national state lotteries, reducing their revenue. Part will be drawn from
spending on private gambling subject to national taxes, so that fiscal revenue will fall.
But these are not the only potential leakages. Most taxes have an impact on the
decisions of taxpayers apart from the pure effect of reducing their incomes. An income
tax may cause people to work less hard, or it may cause them to work harder to maintain
their level of expenditure. In the conventional public finance format, there is a
deadweight loss, or excess burden associated with taxation. The currency transactions
tax causes people to avoid activities that attract the tax. They will, for example, be
inhibited from switching their investment portfolio away from domestic securities
towards those denominated in other currencies. This has an efficiency cost, since they
are not allocating their investments according to the return at the margin. In the case of
the income tax, the choice between income and leisure is distorted (this applies whether
the tax causes the person to work more or to work less). Moreover, there is a
presumption that the distortionary cost increases with the tax rate. The distortion is
much more significant with a transactions tax rate of 20 basis points (0.2 per cent) than
for one with a rate of two basis points (0.02 per cent). This may be an argument for
seeking a new taxbase, rather than increasing existing taxes such as income tax. If one
adds to an already high tax, then the efficiency loss is larger.
Adjustments in behaviour, in turn, may induce market reactions. If a tax on carbon use
is passed on in higher consumer prices, then demand will shift away from goods that are
intensive in their direct or indirect use of fuels. This will make worse off those people
who cannot shift easily from working in those industries, as well as those whose
budgets are particularly weighted towards those goods. The ultimate incidence of the
tax may be rather different from its initial incidence. In order to establish this, we need
to follow through the full general equilibrium effects, allowing for market clearing.
There may be effects on prices, as discussed in section 4.
4.1 A double dividend?
The standard analysis of tax incidence is indeed based on examining a world of
perfectly competitive, perfectly functioning markets. In such a ‘first-best’ context,
government intervention—whatever its distributional advantages—has an efficiency
cost. In the currency transactions tax example, if it were not for the tax the market
would be efficient. The economies of the world are not however well characterized by
perfectly competitive, perfectly functioning markets, and one of the major contributions
of modern public economics has been to explore the implications of market failure. This
has led to arguments that taxes may serve a corrective function: that the excess burden
may become a benefit. The classic example is a corrective tax on environmental
external diseconomies. A tax on the consumption of goods that harm the environment
has a positive allocational effect, switching spending away from polluting goods
towards those causing less or no environmental damage. In these circumstances,9
switching behaviour is desirable. Moreover, if the revenue is used to reduce other taxes
that have a negative allocational effect, we have a ‘double dividend’ (for overviews, see
Goulder 1995, and Sandmo 2000).
The double dividend can arise in the present case in two ways. If the new source is seen
as an alternative to ODA, then it can both make its own efficiency contribution and
allow a reduction in the taxes presently used to finance ODA. This is a good example of
the differential incidence argument in operation. Taxing air transport will not only
reduce the environmental damage of tourism but also allow the income tax to be
reduced, so making staying in the office financially more attractive at the margin.
Taxing carbon may allow payroll taxes to be reduced, leading to a fall in
unemployment. There is an ‘employment dividend’ as well as an ‘environmental
dividend’. The second possibility is that the new source is a net addition to development
resources. In this case, the double dividend consists of the reduced environmental
damage and the benefit from achieving the development goals.
4.2 Questioning the double dividend argument
The double dividend idea appeals to the imagination. However, one has to ask why, if a
new revenue source can generate a positive sum outcome, have national governments
not already adopted such a policy? Why do OECD countries not operate lotteries to
raise funds to finance their ODA? If a carbon use tax would reduce external
diseconomies, why is this not already reflected in domestic taxes? If governments could
reduce unemployment by a switch in taxation, why have they not already done so? To
this central question there are several responses. Here I consider two. First, in a dynamic
world there may well be unexploited opportunities. Second, it may be that the dividend
is global rather than national.
In a dynamic world, new opportunities are always arising and reaction speeds are not
instantaneous. It takes time for new policy needs to become apparent and for
governments to react. A good example is provided in the present context by the issue of
remittances. The arrival of immigrant workers in a city creates a demand for money
transfer services. If entry into this industry is slow, then a few firms, able to extract
monopoly rents, may dominate it in the early stages. Government policy to encourage
competition in the sector can increase the proportion of the transfer that arrives in the
destination country. In this case, competition policy may combine with development
policy to yield a positive sum outcome.
4.3 A global double dividend?
National governments may not impose corrective taxes because the benefits accrue
disproportionately outside their boundaries. The switch from general taxation to carbon
use taxation may be positive sum globally but negative sum nationally. The revenue
calculations of governments take account only of receipts and payments to the national
treasury. The impact of spillovers from one state to another is a staple of fiscal
federalism. Under certain circumstances, local governments may under-supply public
goods that benefit people living outside their borders; and they may over-tax where
taxpayers come from outside. There are fiscal externalities. In the present case, there is
a possible undersupply of fiscal correction to external diseconomies because the costs10
spill over to others. It could be said that we have externalities squared: there is a
possible undersupply of fiscal correction to external diseconomies because there are
externalities in these very costs.
How is this potential argument for additional environmental taxation affected by the
fiscal architecture? We are presupposing that the tax is indeed levied on individuals and
firms in the form of a carbon levy (or other environmental taxbase). Suppose, however,
that we have subsidiarity, where the burden on national governments is determined by
their carbon emissions, but the national governments are free to decide how to raise the
revenue. As noted above, they may for political or other reasons choose another taxbase.
It is still, however, the case that the government faces a financial incentive to reduce its
emissions by other policies, such as auctioning emission permits or regulation.
4.4 Conclusion
The calculation of the leakage, or extra dividend, is a complex matter. Depending on the
circumstances, it may strengthen or weaken the case for new sources as opposed to
existing taxes. The framework needs to be broadened to recognize the departures of
real-world economies from the textbook world of perfectly competitive, perfectly
clearing markets with full information. These departures may mean that there is a
double dividend, where new taxes have a beneficial impact on resource allocation.
Moreover, the double dividend may be global in character, not taken fully into account
in national decisionmaking.
5 Is there a transfer problem?
Economists worry about the effect of policy changes on market prices. A substantial
resource transfer between countries may lead to changes in the prices of different
goods—those exported and imported, and those not traded—that have implications for
recipient and donor countries. These price changes may undermine, or re-enforce, the
benefits from the original transfer.
Keynes addressed this problem after the First World War, when he was concerned with
the impact of reparations being paid by Germany. He identified the ‘transfer problem’
that a country making a transfer might suffer an additional loss through a shift in
demand against their products, causing the terms of trade to turn against them. The
‘terms of trade’ refer to the price of a country’s exports divided by the price of its
imports. If the terms of trade worsen, then a country has to export more units to get the
same number of units of imports. Applied to transfers for development, this would mean
that the recipient countries could enjoy a further benefit from improved terms of trade,
if demand switches towards the products they produce. As clarified by Ohlin (1929) and
subsequent writers (see Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983: Lecture 12 and Brakman and
van Marrewijk 1998), international trade theory shows that the direction of the terms-of-
trade effect depends on the relative marginal propensities to consume in the donor and
recipient countries (how much out of an additional US$1 of income is spent on home
and on imported goods) and the magnitude depends on the price elasticities.
It may be tempting to dismiss the terms-of-trade effects as of only footnote importance.
However, international trade economists take them seriously. Referring to the inflows of11
loans to the US in the early 1980s, Krugman and Obstfeld say ‘the transfer effect was a
major contributor to the large temporary improvement in the US terms of trade’ (1994:
102). According to them, US residents spend about 80 cents of a dollar of additional
income on US goods, whereas foreign residents spend only 10 cents. What then is the
relevance of the transfer problem in the present context? First, it should be noted that, as
far as the impact on recipient countries is concerned, the issue is only relevant when
new sources of funding are a net addition. (When considering the differential effect of
new sources versus increased ODA, the total size of the transfer is assumed constant.)
The transfer problem arises when we contemplate increasing the scale of transfers. In
that case, we have to consider the use made of the funds. Here the balance between
investment and consumption may be significant. If the transfer is largely used to fund
investment, then the pattern of demand may shift towards manufactured capital goods
exported by the donor countries. (This is of course one of the possible functions of the
practice of tying aid.) Account has also to be taken of the intertemporal impact. If there
is a process of catch up over time, then the production possibilities of developing
countries will come to resemble more closely those of rich countries, and the terms-of-
trade effects will become smaller. If the pattern of transfers is brought forward, as with
the International Finance Facility, then the terms-of-trade effect may be accentuated
relative to a smoother time path. This may not outweigh the advantage of earlier
disbursement, but needs to be put into the balance.
The transfer problem also potentially affects the donor countries, and this may be the
case even when the total transfer is held constant. If we consider the differential effect
of new sources and increased ODA, then they may impact on different income groups.
In her analysis of the transfer problem, Chichilnisky (1980) distinguished two income
groups in the donor country, and identified circumstances in which the recipient country
only gained if the poorer group in the donor country were made worse off. Reduced
international inequality was achieved at the expense of increased within-country
inequality. Put differently, this is another example of the possibility that, when we allow
for the changes in market-clearing prices, the ultimate incidence of a new source of
funding may differ from the initial incidence.
5.1 Absorption and the ‘Dutch disease’
For a small developing country, with no specific natural resources, it may appear
fanciful to suppose that its receipt of increased aid could affect the world prices for the
goods it exports and imports. As commonly assumed in economic analysis, many
countries are ‘small’, facing fixed world prices. If they wish to import new investment
goods, then there is an unlimited supply on the world market. In this sense, there is no
problem of ‘absorbing’ the increased flow of funds.
The position is however different once we allow for non-traded goods or services, the
prices of which reflect domestic supply and demand (see Corden and Neary 1982). To
the extent that the transfer increases demand for the non-traded good, its price tends to
rise. There is a real appreciation, in that domestic goods/services become more
expensive relative to the goods traded on the world market. This can cause the
movement of labour out of the sectors producing traded goods. This movement is in the
reverse direction from that required for development and worsens the foreign balance.
As is noted in Mavrotas (2003) and Solimano (2003), domestic policy has to take12
account of the possible impact on domestic demand and inflation. As with the transfer
problem, the issue potentially applies to all proposals for increased transfers of aid.
5.2 Stimulus to world economy
The treatment by Keynes of the transfer problem was ‘notable ... for the classical, or
pre-Keynesian, way he analysed the problem, concentrating on relative price
movements’ (Skidelsky 1992: 309). The existence of involuntary unemployment and
excess capacity can however change the conclusions, in that the responses may be
purely in terms of expanded output, not price changes. One of the arguments for the
creation of SDRs is indeed that they would provide a macroeconomic stimulus to the
world economy. This depends on the extent to which the transfers of SDR allocations
from rich to poor countries lead the latter to increase spending. Clark and Polak (2002)
argue that a regular allocation will not lead to a rise in spending, most countries adding
to their reserves (which in itself has a development benefit), but this may not apply
where there are substantial transfers of SDRs to poor countries.
Macroeconomic stimulus is another form of potential double dividend. Again we have
to explain why this cannot already be achieved. The macroeconomic literature has
extensively discussed the problem of international policy coordination failure. The
existence of failure does not mean that policy coordination necessarily leads to
efficiency gains, but it is possible that there may be a global positive sum outcome to a
creation of additional liquidity. Global spillovers apply at the macroeconomic as well as
the microeconomic level. More concretely, those European governments seeking a way
to re-stimulate their economies should be particularly aware of the potential mutual
benefit. Increased flows of resources for development, generating additional world
demand, may allow Europe to escape the constraints of its macro-policymaking.
5.3 Conclusions
Consideration of the effect of new sources of finance takes us into the working of the
international economy. Substantial transfers may lead to changes in the terms of trade
with implications for both recipient and donor countries. They may affect the relative
prices of traded and non-traded goods, causing domestic inflation. Even holding the
level of transfers constant, different sources of funding and different timing of the flows
may have different effects on demand patterns. Once we allow for involuntary
unemployment and excess capacity, there may be a global double dividend through
stimulus to the world economy. Such a macroeconomic bonus would benefit both
developing and developed countries.
6 Equivalent measures?
Policy tools may look different but have equivalent effects. International trade theory
and public finance have demonstrated a number of important equivalences. A
government can set a tariff on the import of a commodity, or it can set a quota and
auction the import permits. If the quota is set at the level of imports generated by the
tariff, then in a competitive economy the impact is the same, including the revenue to
the government. An income tax with an exemption of all savings is equivalent to a13
uniform value-added tax (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). Such equivalences operate at
the level of the impact on individuals and firms. It is, of course, quite possible that
individuals and firms perceive them differently (an example is given below) and that
their economic consequences are different. Moreover, the political attractiveness may be
quite different. Recasting a proposal in an equivalent form may convert it from an
election-loser to a vote-winner.
In the present context, consideration of such equivalences may allow one to see existing
proposals in a new light or the creation of new ideas. Pursuing the parallel with tariffs
and quotas, we can see for instance that there is a potential equivalence between a
global carbon tax, considered in Sandmo (2003), and the auction of tradeable permits
(see Sandmo 2000 and Pearson 2000). Attention has focused on the global carbon tax,
but another possibility is to auction permits, to produce the same level of revenue, and,
in a world of certainty and perfect competition, the same level of pollution. There are
reasons why in reality the two approaches may differ, but we need to ask, when
considering the global carbon tax proposal, whether it is clearly superior to the
alternative of auctioning permits.
A second example is provided by the discussion of the global lottery in Addison and
Chowdhury (2003). The authors come up with the novel alternative proposal of a global
premium bond, which is a government bond where the capital is maintained (in money
terms) but the interest takes the form of lottery prizes. Experience in the UK suggests
that this appeals to a different market, with the middle- and upper-income groups
participating whereas they do not play the national lottery. Yet the premium bond is
financially equivalent as a transaction to placing money in a regular savings bank and
drawing out the interest each month to buy lottery tickets. There are, of course,
differences in the prize structure and level, and in the tax treatment, but we need to ask
what lies behind the differences in reaction.
The third example concerns the International Finance Facility. Understanding this
imaginative proposal is aided by considering whether or not it is equivalent to a
particular time path of ODA. As noted earlier, it involves bringing forward the
disbursement of funds, but it goes beyond a variation in the time shape in that donors
are precommitted. We have therefore to ask how far the guarantee of funding by donor
countries increases the net value of ODA. How much net additional resources are
generated by the certainty of underwritten flows rather than annual allocations by donor
governments?
6.1 Conclusions
Consideration of the equivalence of different policy instruments is a good discipline and
a source of new ideas. For each proposal we have to consider how far there are
equivalent ways of achieving the same objectives.
7 Conclusion: contribution to the policy debate
The answers given to the questions posed in this paper have been given in the
conclusions to each section. I hope that they will help provide the reader with a
framework to assess the contributions of the different proposals analysed in the various14
project-related discussion papers. Here I end with a reflection on the role of economic
analysis in the policy debate. The proposals for new sources of development funding
have to be seen in a political context. They have been put forward in the light of
political objectives and perceived constraints. This does not imply that economic
analysis should accept these objectives uncritically or that it should be bound by these
constraints (see Boadway 1999). But economic analysis has a role to play in elucidating
the implications of proposals for the achievement of the professed objectives, and in
identifying the costs of political constraints. We might, for example, conclude that the
constraint that the taxbase be chosen by national governments weakens the contribution
of a carbon tax to environmental goals and hence reduces the double dividend. We
might for example conclude that the objectives of the global lottery are better served by
designing a prize structure that does not compete with that of national lotteries. Analysis
of this type is intended to contribute to the public debate.15
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